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CIVIL LIBERTIES DURING WAR: 
HISTORY'S INSTITUTIONAL LESSONS 
ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN 
WARTIME. By William H. Rehnquist. 1 New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1998. Pp. 254. $26.00. 
Margaret A. Garvin2 
What! will you never cease prating of laws to us that have 
swords by our sides? 
3 Pompey Magnus 
Of course the existence of a military power resting on force, 
so vagrant, so centralized, so necessarily heedless of the indi-
vidual, is an inherent threat to liberty. But I would not lead 
people to rely on this Court for a review that seems to me 
wholly delusive .... If the people ever let command of the war 
power fall into irresponsible and unscrupulous hands, the 
courts wield no power equal to its restraint. The chief re-
straint upon those who command the physical forces of the 
country, in the future as in the past, must be their responsibil-
ity to the political judgments of their contemporaries and to 
the moral judgments of history.4 
I. Chief Justice, United State Supreme Court. 
2. Law Oerk to the Honorable Donald P. Lay, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Eighth Circuit. J.D. University of Minnesota, 1999, M.A. University of Iowa, 1994. 
Thanks to Joan Garvin for her patient review of earlier drafts of this paper and for her 
willingness to re·visit Latin. Thanks also to Professor Michael Paulsen, specifically for 
reviewing drafts of this piece, but more importantly for three years of artful teaching. 
Portions of this paper were greatly aided by the work of Diedre McGrath and Heather 
Esau, Korematsu v. United States: 'Legalized Racism' and the Fallacy of Military Neces-
sity, an unpublished piece prepared in Spring 1999; Richard Lau, A Poor Player's Hour 
Upon the Stage: The Clement Vallandigham Affair, an unpublished paper prepared in Fall 
1997 (on file with the author). 
3. Plutarch, The Lives of the Noble Grecians and Romans, "Pompey," in 13 Great 
Books of the Western World 499,503 (Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1990). 
4. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214,248 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting). 
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In All the Laws But One: Civil Liberties In Wartime, Chief 
Justice William Rehnquist crafts a compelling narrative of civil 
liberties during times of declared war. Rehnquist devotes two-
thirds of the book to the Civil War, presenting that era as the 
benchmark for later intersections of war and civil liberties. The 
book details a consistent history of government relegation of 
civil liberties to the backseat during times of war.5 
For anyone interested in history, Chief Justice Rehnquist's 
book is an interesting story of the suspension and suppression of 
civil liberties during wartime. From the very first line, history 
comes to life as Rehnquist describes the cold, drizzly day in Feb-
ruary 1861, when Abraham Lincoln set off to Washington D.C. 
where he "hoped to be inaugurated." (p. 3) But for anyone in-
terested in an analysis of the constitutionality of the suspensions, 
All the Laws But One has surprisingly little to say. All the chap-
ters, but one, are descriptive-they relate historical events, often 
colorfully, but do not evaluate them. It is not until the conclud-
ing chapter that Rehnquist shifts into analysis and compares the 
civil liberty infringements of the Civil War with those of the two 
World Wars and poses normative constitutional questions re-
garding the propriety of such actions. 
In this final chapter Rehnquist identifies three major differ-
ences among the infringements: first, the actor who worked the 
suspension of civil liberties; second, the increasing role of the 
courts since the Civil War; and third, a trend of government to-
ward more tolerance of wartime criticism. Despite these differ-
ences, Rehnquist concludes that the maxim Inter arma silent le-
ges, "In times of war the laws are silent," is an apt description for 
the reality of civil liberties during war. 
5. Rehnquist explicitly limits his discussion to times of declared war, asserting: 
"[w)ithout question the government's authority to engage in conduct that infringes civil 
liberty is greatest in time of declared war." (p. 218) Rehnquist's assertion is open to de-
bate, but for purposes of this review the same limitation will be observed. Rehnquist's 
restriction to times of declared war excludes many of the recent interactions between 
civil liberties and "war" including those that occurred during the Korean and Vietnam 
Wars. (The Civil War, however, though not a declared "war," is at the forefront of 
Rehnquist's discussion.) The limitation precludes discussion of some of the more signifi· 
cant Court decisions defining the scope of executive powers in times of undeclared war 
or foreign affairs crisis. See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 
(1952); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971); Dames & Moore v. 
Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). The exclusion of Youngstown is all the more interesting be-
cause of Rehnquist's role as law clerk for the Court at the time the case was heard, a 
story told in Rehnquist's first book. William H. Rehnquist, The Supreme Court: How It 
Was, How /tis 61-98 (Morrow and Co., 1987). 
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In light of this conclusion Rehnquist poses two important 
questions: first, whether the reluctance of courts to decide 
against the government during war is a necessary evil or a desir-
able phenomenon; {p. 221) second, whether occasional presiden-
tial excesses and judicial restraint in wartime are desirable. (pp. 
224-25) Disappointingly, however, Rehnquist, having raised 
these questions, avoids bringing his vast constitutional experi-
ence to bear on them. This lack of critical analysis is evident 
both in relation to the specific instances Rehnquist relates and in 
his overall analysis of civil liberties during wartime. This defi-
ciency would be tolerable except for the tantalizing moments 
when Rehnquist enters the debate and condemns the wartime 
actions only to retreat without supporting his position. 
In Part I of this review, I examine the key historical events 
discussed in Chief Justice Rehnquist's book and note particular 
instances where he stops short of analyzing the important ques-
tions at stake. In Part II, I review the overall story told by the 
episodes and attempt to answer Rehnquist's final question-
whether judicial restraint during war is desirable. 
I. HISTORICAL INTERSECTIONS OF CIVIL LIBERTIES 
AND WAR 
A. THE CIVIL W AR6 
1. Suspending the Writ of Habeas Corpus 
Lincoln came to office as a sectionally elected president and 
immediately confronted a country literally splitting apart with 
the early secessions of South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Ala-
bama, Mississippi, and Louisiana. (pp. 3-4) Barely a month af-
6. Rehnquist focuses on a handful of key incidents during the Civil War, and this 
review traces those incidents. The only episode in Rehnquist's book excluded from this 
review is the death of President Lincoln and the cast of characters who either helped or-
chestrate the events of that night or aided after-the-fact. While some of the alleged con-
spirators may have had their rights violated during the investigation and court proceed-
ings, these acts occurred after the war and seem to arise more out of frenzied patriotism 
than a systematic denial or trumping of civil liberties by a government. For studies of the 
Lincoln administration and civil liberties, see James G. Randall, Constitutional Problems 
Under Lincoln (U. of Illinois Press, revised cd. I95I); Robert S. Harper, Lincoln And 
The Press (McGraw-Hill, I95I); Mark E. Neely, Jr., The Fate of Libeny: Abraham Lin-
coln and Civil Liberties (Oxford U. Press, I99I); Michael Kent Curtis, Lincoln, Va/-
/andigham, and Anti-War Speech in the Civil War, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. I 05 (I 998). 
See also James M. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom: The Civil War Era 287-90 (Oxford 
U. Press, 1988). 
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ter the inauguration, on April 12, 1861, confederate forces of 
South Carolina fired on Fort Sumter. Two days later, Union 
troops surrendered the Fort. (p. 15) Lincoln immediately sum-
moned the active duty militia. In response to Lincoln's call to 
arms, several more states seceded, including Virginia. Coupled 
with Maryland's threatened secession, this left the Capital nearly 
surrounded by secessionists and their sympathizers. (pp. 16-18) 
When Massachusetts, in answer to Lincoln's call, sent troops to 
Washington, the troops made it as far as Baltimore, where con-
federate sympathizers attacked them. (pp. 20-21) The governor 
of Maryland then shut down the rail lines, essentially cutting off 
Washington from reinforcements.7 (pp. 21-22) 
It was in this context that Lincoln first authorized the sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus on April 27, 1861. (p. 25) 
In a letter addressed to Lieutenant General Scott, Commanding 
General of the Army, Lincoln wrote: 
You are engaged in repressing an insurrection against the 
laws of the United States. If at any point on or in the vicinity 
of the [) military line, which is now [or which shall be] used 
between the City of Philadelphia and the City of Washing-
ton ... you find resistance which renders it necessary to sus-
pend the writ of Habeas Corpus for the public safety, you, 
personally or through the officer in command at the point 
where ... resistance occurs, are authorized to suspend that 
writ.8 
On May 25, 1861, Union forces arrested John Merryman for 
speaking out against the Union, recruiting soldiers to serve in 
the Confederate Army, and participating in the destruction of 
raillines.9 (p. 21) Merryman petitioned Chief Justice Roger Ta-
ney for a writ of habeas corpus. Taney issued the writ on May 
26, 1861. Citing Lincoln's suspension of the writ, General 
George Cadwalader refused to comply and Chief Justice Taney 
immediately issued an attachment for contempt. (p. 33) When 
the dispatched marshal was refused entrance at the fort, Taney 
wrote his famous opinion in Ex parte Merryman. 10 (p. 34) 
7. McPherson, Battle Cry Of Freedom at 90 (cited in note 6). 
8. Letter from Abraham Lincoln to Winfield Scott (April 27, 1861), in Roy P. 
Basler, ed., 4 The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln 347 (Rutgers U. Press 1953). 
9. See also Sherrill Halbert, Lincoln Suspends the Writ of Habeas Corpus, in Allan 
Nevins and Irving Stone, eds., Lincoln: A Contemporary Portrait 95,98 (1962). 
10. Ex Parte Merryman, 17 F. 144 (C.C.D. Md. 1861). One of the more interesting 
character sketches that Chief Justice Rehnquist draws is that of Chief Justice Taney. 
Rehnquist describes Taney's political history from his position as Attorney General un-
der President Andrew Jackson to his appointment to the Court in 1835. (pp. 27-28) 
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Taney's opinion is a vigorous defense of the position that 
Congress alone has the power to suspend the writ. The opinion 
is grounded in an analysis of the structure of the Constitution; 
the placement of the suspension clause in Article I; the execu-
tive's duty to faithfully carry out the laws; and a re~ection of the 
argument that necessity trumps the Constitution. 1 (pp. 36-38) 
Recognizing his lack of power to enforce the decision, Taney 
sent a copy to President Lincoln, noting in the opinion that "[i]t 
will then remain for that high officer, in fulfillment of his consti-
tutional obligation to 'take care that the laws be faithfully exe-
cuted,' to determine what measures he will take to cause the civil 
process of the United States to be respected and enforced."12 (p. 
38) 
Despite this direct appeal, Lincoln all but ignored the Mer-
ryman decision until Congress reconvened in July. He then ar-
gued two points: 1) the exigency of the situation demanded that 
he act pursuant to his higher duty of protecting the union from 
destruction; and 2) no laws had been broken because the execu-
tive possesses independent authority to suspend the writ. 13 On 
July 5, 1861, Attorney General Edward Bates presented a fur-
ther defense of the actions arguing that the branches of govern-
ment are coordinate and coequal.14 (p. 44) Congress took no 
immediate action in the face of this exchange between the judi-
ciary and the executive. 15 
Rehnquist then describes the infamous Dred Scott decision of March 6, 1857, in which 
the Court held that slaves could not be citizens and that Congress lacked the authority to 
enact the Missouri Compromise. This decision evoked hugely negative public response, 
including Lincoln's, in the North. As Rehnquist describes, Lincoln's response went from 
a mild criticism to a stinging rejection. In his first inaugural address, Lincoln made a 
thinly-veiled criticism of the decision: "the candid citizen must confess that if the policy 
of the government, upon vital questions, affecting the whole people, is to be irrevocably 
fixed by decisions of the Supreme Court, the instant they arc made, in ordinary litigation 
between parties, in personal actions, the people will have ceased, to be their own rulers, 
having, to that extent, practically resigned their government, into the hands of that emi-
nent tribunal." Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (March 4, 1861), in 4 The 
Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln at 249, 268 (cited in note 8). Rehnquist uses this 
history to set the scene for the later interaction between Lincoln and Taney following the 
Merryman decision. 
II. Ex Pane Merryman, 17 F. at 146-49. 
12. Id at 153. 
13. Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in 4 
The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln at 421-41 (cited in note 8). 
14. 10 Op. Att'y Gen. 74, 76 (1861). For elaboration sec Michael Stokes Paulsen, 
The Merryman Power and the Dilemma of Autonomous Executive Branch Interpretation, 
15 Cardozo L. Rev. 81,95-97 (1993). 
15. "President Lincoln claimed the right for the Executive .... Congress, in the face 
of this claim, chose to do nothing." Halbert, Lincoln Suspends the Writ at 110 (cited in 
note 9). The Thirty-seventh Congress did debate the issue of authority to suspend but it 
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Rehnquist is critical of the dialogue between Lincoln and 
Taney on two grounds: First, Rehnquist finds Lincoln's response 
to Taney to be rhetorical rather than legal. He notes that Lin-
coln was "the advocate at his very best." (p. 38) Second, 
Rehnquist is critical of Taney's hasty decision-makinp that ig-
nored the deliberative nature of the judicial process. 1 (pp. 40-
41) Rehnquist does not, however, critically engage either of the 
two important constitutional questions that arise from Lincoln's 
suspension of the writ: 1) which branch of government has the 
power to suspend the writ; and 2) whether Lincoln's rejection of 
Taney's Merryman decision was constitutionally proper. 
Rehnquist essentially ignores the first question despite the pro-
lific literature on the topic. 17 With respect to the latter question, 
Rehnquist flatly asserts that the proposition that the President is 
not subordinate to the judicial branch "had been refuted by 
Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison more 
than half a century earlier." (p. 44) This one line dismissal of 
the argument ignores a well-developed and very contentious 
academic debate regarding the power of the executive branch to 
engage in independent constitutional interpretation.18 While 
was not until March 3, 1863, that Congress passed the Habeas Corpus Act of 1863, which 
tacitly approved of Lincoln's acts. See Randall, Constitutional Problems at 130 (cited in 
note 6). The language of the Act can be read either as a grant of authority to the presi-
dent or as a recognition of a pre-existing power. ld Interestingly, even after the passage 
of this Act, Lincoln continued to justify the suspension on either his independent consti-
tutional power or on the situational exigencies; his cabinet, however, began to rely on the 
Act. See Neely, Civil Libenies And Civil War at 68 (cited in note 6). 
16. Rehnquist's analysis here provides insight into his view of how law and judicial 
review ought to work. He notes that "(t]he fact that (Taney] may have reached the cor-
rect result on the merits of the case cannot excuse this want of process." (p. 41) 
Rehnquist eventually falls prey to this same deficiency when he fails to engage the well-
formed debates regarding the constitutionality of executive autonomy. 
17. Sec, e.g., Randall, Constitutional Problems at 118-39 (cited in note 6); William 
F. Duker, A Constitutional History Of Habeas Corpus 24 (Greenwood Press, 1980); Mar-
tin S. Sheffer, Presidential Power 10 Suspend Habeas Corpus: The Taney-Bates Dialogue 
and Ex Parte Merryman, 11 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 1 (1986); Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., 
War and the Constitution: Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt, in Grabor S. 
Boritt, ed., Lincoln, The War President 152 (Oxford U. Press, 1992); Mark J. Rozell, Ex-
ecutive Prerogative: Abraham Lincoln and American Constitutionalism, in Frank J. Wil-
liams and William D. Pederson, cds., Abraham Lincoln: Contemporary 135, 140 (Savas 
Woodbury Pub., 1995). 
18. See the symposium in 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 1-523 (1993)-cspecially Paulsen, 15 
Cardozo L. Rev. 81 (cited in note 14); David A. Strauss, Presidential Interpretation of the 
Constitution, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 113 (1993); Thomas W. Merrill, Judicial Opinions as 
Binding Law and as Explanations for Judgments, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 43 (1993); Michael 
Rosenfeld, Executive Autonomy, Judicial Authority and the Rule of Law: Reflections on 
Constitutional Interpretation and the Separation of Powers, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 137 
(1993). See also Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Most Dangerous Branch: Executive Power 
to Say What the Law Is, 83 Geo. L. Rev. 217 (1994); Geoffrey P. Miller, The President's 
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Rehnquist gives his reader a palpable sense of history, he offers 
no thoughtful evaluation of the lawfulness of Lincoln's suspen-
sion of the writ or of the Lincoln administration's assertion that 
coequal branches of government possess coequal power to inter-
pret the Constitution. For those the reader must turn elsewhere. 
2. The Vallandigham Affair-Military Arrests and Trials 
On September 24, 1862, Lincoln issued a proclamation pro-
viding that persons "discouraging volunteer enlistments, resist-
ing militia drafts, or guilty of any disloyal practice, affording aid 
and comfort to Rebels" should "be subject to martial law and li-
able to trial and punishment by Courts Martial or Military 
Commission."19 (p. 60) Pursuant to this directive, on April 19, 
1863, General Ambrose Burnside, the Commanding General of 
the Department of Ohio, issued General Order 38.20 General 
Order 38 provided, in part, that "'[t]he habit of declaring sympa-
thy for the enemy' ... would no longer be tolerated in the De-
partment of the Ohio; persons 'committing such offenses' would 
be arrested and subject to military procedures." (p. 63) 
In a speech on May 1, 1863, Clement L. Vallandigham de-
nounced President Lincoln, the war policies, and General Order 
38.21 (pp. 65-66) Four days later General Burnside ordered 
Vallandigham's arrest. (p. 66) He was tried before a military 
commission, found guilty and sentenced to imprisonment for the 
duration of the war. (p. 67) Lincoln eventually commuted the 
sentence to banishment from the Union.22 Vallandigham sought 
a writ of habeas corpus from District Judge Humphrey H. 
Leavitt but was denied. (p. 67) Vallandigham sought review of 
the denial from the Supreme Court-but the Court held the mili-
tary commission's actions unreviewable: 
Power of Interpretation: Implications of a Unified Theory of Constitutional Law, 56 Law 
& Contemp. Probs. 35 (1993); Christopher L. Eisgrubcr, The Most Competent Branches: 
A Response to Professor Paulsen, 83 Gco. Law. Rev. 347 (1994); Gary Lawson and Chris-
topher D. Moore, The Executive Power of Constitutional Interpretation, 81 Iowa L. Rev. 
1267 (1996); Alexander M. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch: The Supreme Court at 
the Bar of Politics 259·65 (Yale U. Press, 2d ed. 1986 ). 
19. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 117·18 (cited in note 6 ). 
20. Frank L. Klement, The Limits Of Dissent: Clement L. Vallandigham & The Civil 
War 149 (U. Press of Kentucky, 1970). 
21. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 121 (cited in note 6 ). 
22. Despite internal discussions among Lincoln and his cabinet disagreeing with 
Burnside's summary action, banishment of Vallandigham was the only official action 
taken by the executive. (p. 67) Sec Klement, The Limits Of Dissent at 177 (cited in note 
20); Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts.J. at 136 (cited in note 6). 
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Whatever may be the force of Vallandigham's protest, that he 
was not triable by a court of military commission, it is certain 
that his petition cannot be brought within the [Judiciary Act 
of 1789); and further, that the court cannot, without disre-
garding its frequent decisions and interpretations of the Con-
stitution in respect to its judicial power, originate a writ of 
certiorari to review or pronounce any opinion upon the pro-
ceedings of a military commission. 23 
Lincoln came under heavy criticism for the V allandigham 
Affair. This criticism included a set of resolutions drafted in 
May 1863 at a meeting of Democrats in Albany, New York.24 In 
response to the Albany Resolves Lincoln articulated two de-
fenses: first, the entire country was a war zone and military ar-
rests were justified anywhere the enemy used speech or the press 
to conduct war; and second, the arrest was not for Val-
landigham's speaking in public but for his war on the military. 
(pp. 72-73) In this defense, Lincoln used his famous line, "Must 
I shoot a simple-minded soldier boy who deserts, while I must 
not touch a hair of a wily agitator who induces him to desert?"25 
(p. 73) 
Rehnquist criticizes the Vallandigham Affair on two fronts. 
First, Vallandigham's trial and conviction by the military com-
mission were based on violation of a General's order, not an Act 
of Congress or state legislature-the proper grounds for charg-
ing a defendant. (p. 68) Second, the asserted authority under 
which Vallandigham was prosecuted and convicted was Lin-
coln's proclamation of martial law; yet the scope and definition 
of martial law was unclear at the time. (pp. 68-72) Each of these 
criticisms presents an interesting challenge to the constitutional-
ity of the actions taken in the Vallandigham Affair; yet, 
Rehnquist merely identifies them and does not analyze or evalu-
ate them. Instead, Rehnquist merely asserts that "Lincoln's de-
fense of his actions ... was addressed to the general public, and 
not to constitutional lawyers." (p. 73) The same is true of 
Rehnquist's description of events. 
23. Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. 243,251-52 (1863). The Court never addressed 
the scope of the military's authority although it did note that it presumed the President 
was conscious of his constitutional limits and that he would act within them. Id 
24. Neely, Fate of Liberty at196 (cited in note 6). 
25. Curtis, 7 Wm. & Mary Bill Rts. J. at 160-62 (cited in note 6). Sec also McPher-
son, Battle Cry Of Freedom at 598-99 (cited in note 6). 
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3. The Indianapolis Treason Trials-the Milligan Case 
Less than two years after the Vallandigham Affair the Court 
faced a parallel case. In October 1864, General Alvin Hovey, 
Commander of Indianapolis, ordered the arrest of a group of 
men for conspiracy against the United States.26 (pp. 83, 90-99) 
Milligan and the others were tried before a military commission 
and, on relatively minimal evidence, (pp. 89-100) were convicted 
and sentenced to hang. (p. 102) Milligan petitioned the Circuit 
Court for a writ of habeas corpus arguing that a military court 
could not impose sentence on civilians who were not in a theater 
of war. The Circuit Court certified the question to the Supreme 
Court and arguments were set for March, 1866. (pp. 104, 117) 
The government argued that imposition of martial law al-
lowed military commissions to hear cases and that only military 
authority could review the determinations of such commissions. 
Further, the government argued that the Bill of Rights was com-
posed of '"peace provisions of the Constitution, and like all 
other conventional and legislative laws and enactments are silent 
amidst arms, and when the safety of the people becomes the su-
preme law."' (p. 121) The petitioners argued that martial law 
could be imposed only by Congress and only where necessitated 
by war and, moreover, that civil liberties do not disappear during 
war. (pp. 121-27) On April 3, 1866, the Court entered an order 
directing the writ of habeas corpus to issue. (p. 128) The Court 
explicitly recognized the importance of timing to its decision: 
During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did 
not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so nec-
essary to a correct conclusion of a purely judicial question. 
Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the exercise 
of power; and feelings ... prevailed which are happily termi-
nated. Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as 
well as all others, can be discussed and decided without pas-
sion or the admixture of any element not required to form a 
legal judgment.27 
The Court concluded that martial law could not exist from a 
merely threatened invasion but required a real invasion; more-
26. Randall, Constitutional Problems at 181 (cited in note 6). Rehnquist identifies a 
curious fact about the Milligan arrests: the charges and specifications brought against the 
defendants made no reference to any specific federal statute that criminalized their con-
duct. (pp. 84-87) Rehnquist describes this discrepancy between the military commis-
sion's charges and the law but does not discuss the ramifications of such discrepancy. 
27. Ex pane Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 109 (1866). 
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over, "[m]artial rule can never exist where courts are open, and 
in the proper and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction."28 
(p. 131) The majority opinion went on to state that even Con-
gress could not provide for trial by a military commission.29 (p. 
131). 
In discussing the Court's decision in Milligan, Rehnquist 
criticizes its form but not its content. He chastises the Court for 
its dicta regarding the scope of Congress' power, concluding that 
the Court ignored the traditional rule of not reaching constitu-
tional issues if not necessary.30 (pp. 134-36) Again Rehnquist 
does not evaluate the merits of the case; rather, he makes an 
unargued-for judgment that "[t]he Milligan decision is justly 
celebrated for its rejection of the government's position that the 
Bill of Rights has no application in wartime." (p. 137, emphasis 
added) While civil libertarians may agree with such a conclu-
sion, Rehnquist presents no constitutional argument to justify it. 
B. WORLD WAR I-THE FIRST AMENDMENT. 
Rehnquist turns to the First World War as the next great 
occasion when war came into conflict with civil liberties. He dis-
cusses the initial isolationist policy of the United States and the 
preparedness movement, including the enactment of the con-
scription law. (p. 172) The focus of the chapter, however, is the 
Espionage Act passed in June 1917, and the amendments 
thereto, known as the Sedition Act. Title I, Section Three of the 
Act criminalized any interference with military operations and 
any acts causing "insubordination, disloyalty, mutiny, or refusal 
of duty"; Title XII, Section Two declared certain materials un-
mailable if they contained "any matter advocating or urging 
treason, insurrection, or forcible resistance to any law of the 
United States. "31 (p. 173) 
Rehnquist surveys a number of cases decided under this 
Act.32 He begins with the arrest and conviction of Charles T. 
28. Id. at 127. 
29. Id. at 121-22. 
30. Rehnquist defends this rule by noting that the Court's dicta led to later prob-
lems. Specifically, he refers to the World War II case of Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
(1942), which involved the trial of Richard Quirin and seven other German soldiers who 
landed on the United States shore with the intent to bomb. A military tribunal was es-
tablished to hear the case. The Court upheld the government's action but had to strain 
to distinguish the Milligan dicta regarding the scope and timing of military commissions. 
31. 40 Stat. 217,219,230 (1917). 
32. Most thoroughly, Masses Publ'g Co. v. Patten, 246 F. 24 (2d Cir. 1917); Schenck 
v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. 
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Schenck for mailing leaflets opposing conscription. 33 (p. 174) In 
upholding Schenck's conviction the Supreme Court announced 
its "clear and present danger" test by which to judge whether 
speech is protected by the First Amendment. (p. 174) The 
Schenck Court expressly recognized that the timing of the case-
war time-affected the outcome: "When a nation is at war many 
things which might be said in time of peace are such a hindrance 
to its efforts that their utterance will not be endured so long as 
men fight ... no Court could regard them as protected by any 
constitutional right. "34 (p. 174) Rehnquist contends that 
Schenck "put some flesh and bones on the First Amendment" 
but that the test established was less than clear. (p. 174) With-
out more, he turns to other incidents and court decisions fol-
lowing Schenck. 
Rehnquist does not thoroughly analyze the constitutionality 
of any of the incidents or cases he identifies nor does he provide 
a clear picture of how the First Amendment should work during 
war. In fact, Rehnquist rarely injects himself into the discussion 
of these cases. He does, however, make two points: First, he 
criticizes the Court's failure to distinguish between actual advo-
cacy of unlawfulness and strongly worded criticism and notes, "if 
freedom of speech is to be meaningful, strong criticism of gov-
ernment policy must be permitted even in wartime .... Advo-
cacy which persuades citizens that a law is unjust is not the same 
as advocacy that preaches disobedience to it." (p. 178) Thus, 
Rehnquist provides a terse statement of his view of protected 
speech but does not address the courts' constitutional analysis or 
articulate a more appropriate test for the First Amendment 
during war. Rehnquist's second point is that later cases do not 
follow logically from the "clear and present danger" test of 
Schenck. (p. 182) But he refrains from going further and ana-
lyzing this disjuncture or positing a resolution. 
Rehnquist, however, does draw some generalizations re-
garding the state of civil liberties during World War I as com-
pared with the Civil War. He asserts that the Wilson administra-
tion, like the Lincoln administration, desired to suppress 
criticism of the war. (p. 182) He then identifies several differ-
ences: during World War I, it was Congress, as opposed to the 
United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919); Pierce v. United States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920). 
33. Sec Richard Polcnberg, Fighting Faiths: The Abrams Case, The Supreme Court, 
And Free Speech 212 (Viking, 1987). 
34. Schenck, 249 U.S. at 52. 
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president, that acted; judicial review occurred more often; there 
was no suspension of the writ of habeas corpus; there were no 
trials of civilians before military courts (although Congress at-
tempted to authorize such); and while there were arrests and de-
portations, they occurred after hostilities ceased. (pp. 182-83) 
Rehnquist does little beyond naming these five differences. The 
only evaluative comment is one made summarily: "Though the 
courts during this period gave little relief to civil liberties claim-
ants, the very fact that the claims were being reviewed by the ju-
diciary was a step in the right direction for proponents of civil 
liberties during wartime." (p. 182) Rehnquist applauds judicial 
review during wartime but does not say what the substance of 
that review should be. He provides a clear and concise descrip-
tion of the war cases, but without any evaluation or argument. 
C. WORLDWARII 
1. The Japanese Internment 
Rehnquist presents a brief overview of the beginnings of 
World War II, including Pearl Harbor and the effect that that at-
tack had on the west coast's fear of imminent invasion and view 
of persons of Japanese ancestry. (pp. 184-90) On February 19, 
1942, President Roosevelt signed Executive Order 9066 that 
gave the Secretary of War the legal power to exclude all persons, 
citizens and aliens, from designated areas on the west coast.35 (p. 
192) On March 21, 1942, Congress passed a law imposing crimi-
nal penalties for violating the Order or any regulations promul-
gated to implement it. (p. 192) The regulations passed pursuant 
to the order included a curfew, a requirement to report to relo-
cation centers, and the removal of persons from designated ar-
eas.36 (p. 192) These regulations resulted in four cases reaching 
the Supreme Court-those involving Gordon Hirabayashi, Mi-
noru Y asui, Fred Korematsu and Mitsuye Endo. 
In Hirabayashi31 and Yasui38 the Court narrowed the scope 
of review to the issue of the curfew and unanimously upheld the 
regulation. (p. 198) The Court cited the pervasiveness of the 
35. Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (1942). On its face the order was not 
racially based; however, it was commonly understood to be targeted at the Japanese. 
36. See Joel B. Grossman, The Japanese American Cases and the Vagaries of Con-
stitutional Adjudication in Wartime: An Institutional Perceptive, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 649, 
651 (1997). 
37. Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) 
38. Yasui v. United States, 320 U.S. 115 (1943) 
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war power and found that the "war power of the national gov-
ernment is 'the power to wage war successfully'."39 (p. 199) The 
Court did not engage in an independent analysis of the govern-
ment's alleged facts regarding the military threat.40 Instead, the 
Court concluded as follows: 
That reasonably prudent men charged with the responsibility 
of our national defense had ample ground for concluding that 
they must face the danger of invasion, take measures against 
it, and in making the choice of measures consider our internal 
situation, cannot be doubted. 41 
The Court decided the Korematsu case next, addressing the 
general relocation program. (p. 200) Again the Court upheld 
the conviction-although no longer unanimously.42 The majority 
opinion relied on the Hirabayashi decision, again did not identify 
any independent evidence of military necessity or imminent 
danger from Japanese-Americans, and again deferred to the 
government.43 (pp. 200-01) 
The fourth case, Endo,44 was argued and decided at the 
same time as Korematsu. The issue in this case was not a direct 
challenge to the regulations; instead, Endo sought a writ of ha-
beas corpus claiming that she could not be held after proving her 
loyalty. The Court unanimously agreed that Endo was entitled 
to be released. It based this decision on the scope of the Act of 
Congress and the Executive Order rather than on the Constitu-
tion but hinted that there might be constitutional difficulties as 
well. (pp. 201-02) 
Rehnquist briefly injects commentary at this point, recog-
nizing the importance of timing to these decisions, yet asserting 
that timing ought not to dictate outcomes. (p. 202) He does not 
specifically analyze the rationales or constitutional reasoning of 
the Court in any of the cases. However, in the book's most in-
ventive and critical chapter, Chapter 16, Rehnquist engages and 
analyzes the post-war criticisms of the Japanese relocation and 
internment programs. First, he asserts that the Court's decision 
39. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 93 (citation omitted). 
40. Grossman, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. at 659 (cited in note 36). 
41. Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. at 94. 
42. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Justices Roberts, Jackson, and 
Murphy dissented. 
43. For a discussion of the Court's failure to identify independent evidence sec 
Leslie T. Hatamiya, Righting A Wrong: Japanese Americans and the Passage of the Civil 
Liberties Act of /988 at 218 (Stanford U. Press, 1993). 
44. Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
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to deal only with the curfew in Hirabayashi was one grounded in 
the well-established and sensible rule of avoiding constitutional 
decision-making when possible. (p. 205) Second, while admit-
ting that too much deference to government is troubling, he rec-
ognizes inherent and institutional difficulties of reviewing mili-
tary judgments. (p. 205) Third, he analyzes the criticisms of 
racism leveled against the programs and notes that, while some 
of the criticism is justified, there should be a distinction between 
the Issei-immigrants from Japan, and the Nisei-the children 
of those immigrants born in the United States and therefore citi-
zens of this country by birth. (pp. 203, 206) Finally, Rehnquist 
argues that while there were different treatments of the German 
and Italian nationals during the war, there may have been facts 
sufficient to differentiate these situations. (p. 211) 
2. Martial Law in Hawaii 
Just hours after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, the territorial 
governor of Hawaii issued a proclamation of martial law and 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus.45 (p. 212) Pursuant to this 
proclamation, Lieutenant General Walter Short became the 
military governor of Hawaii and issued a number of orders 
regulating conduct of citizens. (pp. 212-13) A number of cases 
challenging martial law came before the federal courts and 
caused a great deal of tension between the federal courts and the 
military command. One such case involved Judge Delbert 
Metzger, a federal district judge, who issued a show cause order 
for two imprisoned naturalized German-Americans. (pp. 214-
15) Lieutenant General Robert Richardson, Commander of the 
Military Department of Hawaii, successfully evaded the marshall 
who was attempting to serve the order. (p. 215) This stand-off 
resulted in Metzger declaring Richardson in contempt of court 
and Richardson ordering Metzger to retract and no longer issue 
writs of habeas corpus. (pp. 214-15) Only the intervention of 
the Secretary of War prevented the issue from being litigated 
further. (p. 215) 
A later challenge to martial law did progress through the 
court system but only after the war had ended-Duncan v. Ka-
hanamoku.% Two American-born citizens were convicted and 
45. For an in-depth discussion of martial law in Hawaii, see Harry N. Scheiber and 
Jane L. Scheiber, Bayonets in Paradise: A Half-Cenrury Retrospect on Marcial Law in 
Hawai'i, 1941-1946, 19 U. Haw. L. Rev. 477 (1997). 
46. 327 u.s. 304 (1946). 
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sought a writ of habeas corpus; the Supreme Court held that the 
District Court's issuance of the writ was proper. (p. 216) Justice 
Black wrote for the Court and concluded that the Act that 
authorized martial law did not intend the military regime to su-
persede the civilian regime any more than war necessitated.47 (p. 
216) 
Rehnquist briefly considers the importance of post-war 
timing to the Duncan decision and contends that the crimes at 
issue, embezzling and brawling, could not easily be classified as 
national security threats. (p. 217) He then asserts that even 
during the more restrictive Civil War there was never a sugges-
tion that military courts try ordinary civilian crimes. (p. 217) 
Based on these brief observations, Rehnquist concludes: "The 
post-World War II court surely reached the right result in 
Duncan." (p. 217, emphasis added) Although, Rehnquist's con-
clusion may be correct, he does not argue for it or provide any 
foundation to support it. The reader is left with yet another de-
scription of events with no analysis of the constitutionality of the 
acts. 
II. THE REALITY OF CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WAR 
I do not think [President Roosevelt] was much concerned 
with the gravity or implications of this step. He was never 
theoretical about things. What must be done to defend the 
country must be done .... Nor do I think that the constitu-
tional difficulty plagued him- the Constitution has never 
greatly bothered any wartime President.48 
Rehnquist's book provides a survey of civil liberties during 
wartime that, taken together, shows that war efforts will take 
precedence over civil liberties during the perceived crisis. Ac-
cording to Rehnquist's analysis there are significant differences 
among these historical intrusions: 1) the actor who worked the 
intrusion;49 2) the courts more often reviewed cases during the 
World Wars, resulting in more Supreme Court precedent; (p. 
220) and 3) the administrations moved away from the "heavy-
47. ld at 316-17. 
48. Francis Biddle, In Brief Authority 219 (Doubleday & Co., 1962). 
49. During the Civil War, President Lincoln's unilateral actions resulted in civil lib-
erty infringements; during World War I, the Postmaster General acted pursuant to con-
gressional authorization; during World War II, President Roosevelt acted-but was rap-
idly supported by Congress and endorsed by the courts. (p. 219) 
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handed" approach of the Civil War toward World War II's lack 
of any generalized effort to condemn criticism.50 (p. 221) 
Regardless of these differences, review by the Supreme 
Court has historically followed a predictable pattern: in all the 
cases, but one, review during times of war has resulted in a deci-
sion upholding government action (Vallandigham, Schenck, 
Abrams, Hirabayashi, Korematsu);51 whereas, post-war review 
has provided the occasion for judicial rejection of executive or 
congressional excesses and reinvigoration of civil liberties (Milli-
gan, Endo, Duncan). The Court's review during time of war can 
be classified into three types of decision: 1) decisions upholding 
the executive/congressional action; 2) decisions holding the issue 
non-justiciable or outside the Court's jurisdiction; and 3) deci-
sions holding against the executive/congressional action. Inter-
estingly, each of these outcomes led to a negative impact on civil 
liberties. 
First, as Rehnquist's history reveals, when the Supreme 
Court reviews cases and reaches the merits during times of war it 
tends to uphold executive action, accepting executive claims of 
necessity and deferring to the President. Korematsu is the most 
egregious example of the Court genuflecting to executive claims. 
The Supreme Court accepted the War and Justice Departments' 
assertions of emergency and threat with little or no independent 
analysis of the basis of those claims.52 This acceptance of the ex-
ecutive's claims is not necessarily due to any malfeasance on the 
part of the judiciary; rather, both institutional and human limita-
tions may act to restrain judicial review during war.53 Regard-
less, Korematsu is the rule, not the exception: courts finding 
themselves at the mercy of executive characterizations of war of-
ten accept those characterizations. The long-term impact of 
50. Rehnquist identifies the Lincoln era as the most egregious in terms of aggres-
sive infringements on civil liberties. This point can be debated. Sec, e.g., Neely, Fate of 
Liberty (cited in note 6); Randall, Constitutional Problems (cited in note 6). 
51. The exception was Chief Justice Taney's decision in Merryman. 
52. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 218. Peter Irons conducted intense post·war investiga-
tion into the government's assertion of military necessity and threat from the Japanese-
American population and argues that racism rather than necessity guided the action and 
that the War and Justice Departments each were guilty of suppressing critical informa-
tion. Sec Peter lrons,lustice At War (Oxford U. Press, 1983). 
53. Sec Christopher N. May, In The Name Of War: Judicial Review and the War 
Powers Since 1918 at 256 (Harvard U. Press, 1989) (pointing out that judges face obsta-
cles in obtaining necessary information for resolving questions); Clinton Rossiter and 
Richard P. Longaker, The Supreme Court And The Commander In Chief91 (Cornell U. 
Press, expanded cd. 1976) (arguing that courts and judges are not immune to nationalism 
and a desire to win the war). 
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blindly upholding executive action, as the Court did in Kore-
matsu, is the creation of a questionable line of precedents. Al-
exander Bickel has noted the legitimating function of judicial re-
view: "Not only is the Supreme Court capable of generating 
consent for hotly controverted legislative or executive measures; 
it has the subtler power of adding a certain impetus to measures 
that the majority enacts rather tentatively."54 Consequently, af-
ter the war we are left with precedents of expanded governmen-
tal power, and diminished civil liberty, that the Supreme Court 
has blessed with its stamp of constitutional approval. Thus, "[b]y 
engaging in what was merely a formal exercise, the justices not 
only denied relief to the aggrieved individuals but left behind a 
series of decisions which are still part of our constitutionallaw."55 
These precedents may result in increased restrictions on individ-
ual civil liberties both post-war and, importantly, during the next 
war. 
Second, the Court may invoke doctrines of justiciability to 
avoid deciding a question. During the Civil War the Court faced 
the case of Val/andigham and held that it had no jurisdiction to 
review the actions of a military commission. By adopting this 
stance the Court permitted power to go unchecked. Even more 
troubling, the Court's decision could have resulted in permanent 
abdication of review; the Court, however, was fortunate enough 
to be confronted with a parallel case immediately post-war-
Milligan. As discussed above, the only substantive difference be-
tween Vallandigham and Milligan was timing-the former oc-
curred during the war and the Court chose to avoid its adjudica-
tion, while the latter occurred post-war and the Court granted 
review. While the Court did eventually reverse itself in terms of 
review of military commissions, such an about-face is not always 
accomplished easily. Thus, while certain justiciability doctrines 
may aid the Court in deferring cases until independent post-war 
review is possible, others risk permanent forfeiture of review. 
Third, when courts exercise independent review and hold 
against the executive they risk executive rejection of their 
authority.56 While this has only occurred once, in Ex parte Mer-
54. Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 30-31 (cited in note 18). 
55. May, In The Name Of War at 264 (cited in note 53). Although the Korematsu 
decision has been questioned by many, it is still considered good Jaw. 
. 56. Most scholars agree that the President has an obligation to enforce specific 
judgments rendered by courts regardless of his or her own interpretation of the constitu-
tionalit~ thereof. Michael Stokes Paulsen is the exception to this, arguing that the ex-
ecullve IS a fully co-equal branch. Sec Paulsen, 83 Geo. L. R. 217 (cited in note 18). Cf. 
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ryman, the potential for executive rejection exists. Rehnquist 
dismisses such presidential power as unconstitutional. As noted 
earlier, this dismissal ignores the very live academic debate re-
garding the scope and degree of executive autonomy.57 Thus, de-
spite Rehnquist's repudiation of Lincoln's actions, history and 
constitutional theory reveal the executive might refuse to defer 
to the Court's judgment. 
After presenting a history demonstrating these three nega-
tive possibilities of wartime review, Rehnquist fails to describe 
an alternative image of how or when the courts should act during 
war. The outcomes illustrated by the described episodes all fall 
short of an ideal Court acting as a check on the executive and 
protector of civil liberties. 
A possible alternative view of the Court's role can be found 
in Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 58 the landmark case on 
which a young William Rehnquist worked as a law clerk for Jus-
tice Robert Jackson, a story Rehnquist told at length in one of 
his earlier books, but does not discuss in All the Laws But One. 
Justice Jackson's famous concurrence in Youngstown articulated 
a three-tiered analysis of executive authority. 
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied 
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for 
it includes all that he possesses in his own right plus all that 
Congress can delegate. In these circumstances, and in these 
only, may he be said (for what it may be worth) to personify 
the federal sovereignty .... When the President acts in ab-
sence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he 
can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there is a 
zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concur-
rent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. There-
fore, congressional inertia, indifference or quiescence may 
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, 
measures on independent presidential responsibility. In this 
area, any actual test of power is likely to depend on the im-
peratives of events and contemporary imponderables rather 
than on abstract theories of law .... When the President takes 
measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of 
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely 
only upon his own constitutional powers minus any constitu-
tional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain 
Lawson and Moore, 81 Iowa L. Rev. at 1321-24 (cited in note 18); Steven G. Calabrcsi, 
Caesarism, Departmentalism, and Professor Paulsen, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1425 (1999). 
57. Sec notes 18 and 56. 
58. 343 u.s. 579 (1952). 
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exclusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling 
the Congress from acting upon the subject.59 
709 
Justice Jackson was specifically talking about the scope of presi-
dential powers. But his analysis can be mapped onto judicial re-
view of wartime actions to determine the proper timing of such 
review. 
What was crucial in Youngstown was that not only was 
President Truman's conduct unauthorized by Congress, but in 
fact, it ran contrary to an existing statutory process for handling 
labor disputes.60 This stands in contrast to the wartime events 
described in Rehnquist's book. In those cases Congress pre-
approved the executive's actions, quickly acted to ratify them, or 
chose not to respond immediately. The executive always acted 
either within its own prescribed powers or at least within Jack-
son's "twilight zone" of power. 
Employing Jackson's Youngstown approach, coupled with 
what Alexander Bickel has labeled the "passive virtues"61 -those 
techniques of the Court allowing it to not decide a case-one can 
construct a methodology for the timing of judicial review of war-
time actions. When the executive acts during war with either 
explicit or implicit authorization of Congress it is acting with 
considerable authority. During these times the judiciary ought 
to remain silent until post-war when it can act independently, 
deliberatively, and with less risk of executive rejection. If, how-
ever, the executive branch acts contrary to an explicit position of 
Congress, its power is at its "lowest" ebb and the Court ought to 
act, even during war. When the Court reviews such unilateral 
and unsupported executive actions it can avoid the pitfalls ex-
hibited by history and can truly act as a check on the executive. 
Only when two branches of government independently reach the 
conclusion that executive action is unconstitutional are the bene-
fits of the Court's temporary silence outweighed by the need for 
a check on the executive's power. 
While post-war review does not rectify the indignities ex-
acted on individuals during the war, it can provide precedents 
which may curtail future governmental excesses. As Christopher 
May has noted: 
59. ld at 635-38 (Justice, J ., concurring) (footnotes omitted). 
60. May, In The Name Of War at 259 (cited in note 53). 
61. See Bickel, The Least Dangerous Branch at 111-98 (cited in note 18); Alexander 
M. Bickel, The Supreme Court 1960 Term-Foreword: The Passive Virtues, 75 Harv. L. 
Rev. 40 (1961). 
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Delaying review without foregoing it entirely strengthens the 
Constitution in time of emergency. This "technique of the 
mediating middle" allows the executive to act unencumbered 
while the crisis rages, while helping to ensure that its conduct 
will not become an exercise in tyranny. Those who wield 
emergency power will act with the knowledge that they may 
later have to answer for their conduct. If judges defer inter-
vention until they are able to function in an independent 
manner, courts can play an important role in this process of 
b 'l' 62 accounta 1 1ty. 
Thus, if the Court refrains from reviewing cases during war when 
the executive is acting either at the height of its power or in the 
twilight zone, it may avoid the pitfalls exhibited by the episodes 
related by Chief Justice Rehnquist and yet preserve the oppor-
tunity for significant post-war decision-making. 
CONCLUSION 
Rehnquist poses the question of whether occasional presi-
dential excesses and judicial restraint during wartime are desir-
able and concludes: 
It is neither desirable nor is it remotely likely that civil liberty 
will occupy as favored a position in wartime as it does in 
peacetime. But it is both desirable and likely that more care-
ful attention will be paid by the courts to the basis for the 
government's claims of necessity as a basis for curtailing civil 
liberty. The laws will thus not be silent in time of war, but 
they will speak with a somewhat different voice. (pp. 224-25) 
While Rehnquist posits this move toward more careful court re-
view and a "different voice" of laws, he stops short of describing 
what this would look like or when it would occur. This rather 
prosaic conclusion exemplifies Rehnquist's unexpected lack of 
insight in addressing such an important issue. 
If Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote a book to entertain and in-
trigue, he has succeeded-but one expects more when reading a 
book by the Chief Justice on issues of constitutional importance. 
The title of Rehnquist's book refers to President Lincoln's mes-
sage to Congress on July 4, 1861 and suggests that the book may 
offer an answer to Lincoln's rhetorical question, "Are all the 
laws, but one, to go unexecuted, and the government itself to go 
to pieces, lest that one be violated?" While the title is enticing, 
62. May,/n The Name Of War at269 (cited in note 53). 
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Rehnquist provides no answer to the question that Lincoln 
posed. Instead, he concludes the book with a chapter entitled 
Inter Arma Silent Leges, "In times of war the laws are silent." 63 
This phrase, like most of Rehnquist's book, is merely descriptive 
of the historical intersections of war and civil liberties. 
Throughout the book Rehnquist exhibits a hesitance for openly 
critiquing and analyzing the historical events that he relates and 
leaves the reader with only a vacant sense of the errors of history 
and no tangible alternative for the future. One possible alterna-
tive future can be culled from the episodes that Rehnquist re-
lates. When the judiciary injects itself into wartime actions, in 
any circumstance other than when the executive and Congress 
disagree, the possible outcomes are negative. Perhaps the lesson 
to be learned from Rehnquist's historical survey is that, gener-
ally, judicial review ought to be stayed during times of war and 
that the proper maxim should be Silete leges enim inter arma, 
"For the laws ought to be silent in times of war." 
63. This Latin phrase is actually a paraphrase of the Ciceronian maxim: Silent enim 
leges inter arnw, "During times of war the laws arc truly silent." The phrase is taken 
from a speech Cicero wrote in defense of Titus Annius Milo who was on trial for murder 
during a time of martial law and when the formal trial procedures were being arbitrarily 
changed. Paul MacKendrick, The Speeches Of Cicero: Context, Law, Rhetoric 372 
(Duckworth & Co., 1995). It is interesting to note the reversed arrangement of the 
phrasing of the original line and the one employed by Rehnquist. Arrangement of Latin 
IS governed by two elements: grammar and rhetoric. The rhetorical element effects em· 
phasis and can specifically be produced by reversing the ordinary position of the words. 
Sec B.L. Gildersleeve and Gonzalez Lodge, Gildersleeve's Latin Gramnwr 428-29 (Mac-
millan and Co., 3d cd. 1960). The removal of the modifier "enim" and the reversal of the 
arrangement may be read to minimize the forcefulness of the phrase. 
